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1. Obtaining A Sense of Perspective: Understanding the
nature of our job is the first step at accomplishing its
objectives.
I want to thank the Director for those kind introductory
comments, but if I was sitting where you are today I might well ask
Why did they invite this guy to speak to hearing officers of the National
Appeals Division? I'm a hearing examiner for the State of Ohio, I'm
not connected in any way to the Department of Agriculture, and before
accepting the Director's invitation I had never met anyone from the
Department. I know I wasn't chosen because of my experiences in
Kansas, because I didn't tell them about those experiences, so they
don't know that I completed my undergraduate and law degrees in one
of America's best agricultural settings, in Lawrence, Kansas; that I
began my practice in a four-room farmhouse sitting on the edge of 80
acres of soybeans in Olathe, Kansas, clerking for a small law firm in
Kansas City, Kansas, whose clients would meet us for lunch at the
Hereford House at 2 0 'h and Main in Kansas City, Missouri; those clients
included farmers who, in the early 1980s, were keenly aware of the
vagaries of nature and the incomprehensible behavior of governments,
and who knew that bankruptcy was never more than one or two
planting seasons from their door.
And for sure I wasn't chosen because of my comprehensive
knowledge of the agricultural system, because I haven't got it. My
legal training is in criminal defense as a public defender in Junction
City, Kansas, home of the Big Red One, our country's First Infantry
*Administrative Hearing Examiner, State of Ohio.
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Division; it's as a managing attorney for a small Kansas City, Kansas,
law firm specializing in the needs of lower to middle class mid-
westerners needing wills and divorces; it's as a bureaucrat, paternity
litigator and prosecutor in child support enforcement under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support act, it's as an Assistant Ohio
Attorney General, serving the business and governmental boards and
commissions of the state as a lead regulatory prosecutor, and in its
present incarnation, it's as an administrative hearing examiner for state
regulatory and professional boards in Ohio.
So my credentials are indeed limited: Instead of being the expert
in agricultural law, I find myself making a presentation to a group made
up of about one-third of the nation's best-informed agricultural
adjudicators, people who have made it their life's business and
profession to understand how our nation's agricultural systems operate,
and who understand - from having lived it - the important and often
complex role played by our federal, state and local governments in
those systems.
So maybe the reason I've been allowed to meet with you today
is not because I'm an expert on farming or agricultural law, but instead
it's because the Department and the National Appeals Division saw the
need for someone outside the Division to poke around a little and report
an outsider's view. My task was to study and then teach what I can
about the role of the hearing officer in the Department's National
Appeals Division. So, over the past few months I've taken the
opportunity to learn about the Division, to see how it fits in the
bureaucratic hierarchy here at the Department, and how the Department
helps advance the agricultural policies set by our Congress and our
President. Before I go any further I want to make an editorial comment,
because I've just now referred to the Division as fitting into a
bureaucratic hierarchy, and I want to make plain my intentions when
using that term. It's pretty common when we see or hear the use of the
word bureaucracy that it's in a negative or pejorative sense, you know,
like "it was a bureaucratic nightmare" or "the bureaucracy is just too
entrenched to work properly". . . that sort of thing. I don't think of us
in a negative way, and I don't use the term bureaucrat in a negative
way. As a group, we've taken on the responsibility of carrying out
congressional mandates, to the best of our ability, and I'm proud to
serve in this capacity. I suspect each of you share in that pride, and as
Brief History, A Contemporary Perspective
such will not read into my use of bureaucratic a negative meaning,
because none is intended.
As I learned more about the role of the Division, by examining
the events that led to its creation and its later evolution to its present
form, I found this to be an excellent example of how the executive
branch of our federal government can break away from entrenched
approaches of governing, and can evolve to a system that is better
equipped to provide the services called for by its enabling legislation.
Taking what I've learned in that effort, I've attempted to identify some
of the unique characteristics of the Division and its approach to
administrative adjudications. After identifying what the Division is and
what it does, and who the men and women are who make up the
Division, and after seeing how you carry out your role as executive
adjudicators, some thoughts come to mind that I hope might be of use
as you make this collective effort to reflect on the role of the
administrative hearing officer in the National Appeals Division.
I've called this presentation a "brief history, a contemporary
perspective, and some thoughts for the future" of the National Appeals
Division and of its administrative hearing officers. To set the stage for
the presentation I would ask each of you a question, and I'll choose
three of you to provide answers. I teach a legal research and writing
course to first year students at Capital University Law School, and I
know the best answers typically come from the people who arrive late
and tend to sit in the back of the room, so I'll probably pick on some of
you in the last row to answer this question:
a. Pop quiz: What's the most recent official act you
completed for the Division?
Now let me ask any of you, Where did the authority come from
that gave you the power to do that act?
If you had to explain the source of that authority to students in
the eighth grade, to students who have been taught the rudiments about
the separation of powers in our federal and state governments, of the
legislative, the judicial, and the executive branches of government,
what would you tell them? I ask these questions because the source of
our authority as public servants makes all the difference in the world.
One of the central constitutional principals supporting our democratic
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and judicial systems is the notion that the people hold all the power not
expressly given to our governing authorities, and of those powers given
to our government, the states hold all powers not expressly reserved by
our federal Constitution to the federal government. Although to most
of us mere mortals the federal government seems huge, almost
omnipresent and omnipotent, the bottom line is the federal government
is one of limited powers, with all the residual and reserve powers vested
in either the individual states or in the people. The implication of this
is that if we believe there is a power held by a federal entity, that power
must find its source in one of the three branches of our federal
government: the executive, legislative, or judicial.
So when I asked about the last time you completed an official
act, I was asking about the use of power in the federal government.
What I hope to do over the next hour or so is offer some suggestions
about the nature of that power: I want to talk about what the power is,
where it comes from, what some of its limitations are, and how it can
best be put to use. To do this, I want to take this somewhat abstract
notion, governmental power, and place it in the context of a very real
and tangible commodity: your job. Because as I understand it, over the
next four days, the Division, through its Director, hopes that this
presentation and those that follow it will help each of you continue to
provide outstanding service to the farmers, the agricultural world and
to all Americans. I will have accomplished my goal if I leave you with
a better understanding of the nature of the executive adjudicator and
maybe a better understanding of the nature of your role in American
jurisprudence.
This, by the way, isn't the first time I've had the opportunity to
talk about the role of the executive adjudicator. Some of you here were
also in Denver in the fall of 1997 when I was introduced as the 1997
recipient of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
Fellowship. Mine was one of a series of fellowships bestowed by the
National Administrative Law Foundation, all aimed at improving the
public and professional awareness of the role of the administrative
adjudicator. When I appeared before the men and women of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges in Denver, my task
was a little bit different, because then I was speaking to an audience
that consisted of non-lawyer hearing officers, as well as federal
Administrative Law Judges, in-house hearing officers, state hearing
examiners, virtually the full range of persons who share one common
attribute: they serve the executive branch of government, hear evidence,
make findings of fact based on evidence presented to them, and in short
are executive adjudicators. I'll continue to use that term, administrative
or executive adjudicators, because it draws upon the single most
important blend of attributes of the administrative judiciary: we're a
special breed of government officials, trained to fulfil a role
traditionally reserved to the judicial branch, but created as part of a
mandate conferred by the legislative branch, and carried out by the
executive branch.
Whenever one attempts to describe the role of an administrative
adjudicator it probably helps to learn a little about just what it is the
adjudicator does: what kind of conflicts are brought to her attention?
Who are the people who appear before him? What kind of relief are
the litigants seeking, and who is it that is supposed to give that relief?
I recall reading the report issued in a case involving three farm
partnerships, each operated as partnerships in Texas, and each having
some overlapping of partners; in fact, one person was a partner in each
of the three partnerships. You could tell it was a family-run farm. One
of the three partnerships became more than 90 days delinquent on farm
loans, and obtained protection under a Chapter 12 bankruptcy. That
partnership had ceased to function in the same year it obtained relief in
bankruptcy, but the other two partnerships continued to operate. About
nine years later, the Farm Service Agency sent the defunct partnership
a notice of intent to offset. True to its word, the Agency then offset
payments that were due under the Production Flexibility Contract and
under the Conservation Reserve Program, but the offset was imposed
against the other two partnerships, even though those partnerships were
not a party to the delinquent debt owed by the now-defunct partnership.
The scene is set, making it a little easier to describe the role of
our administrative adjudicator: he or she (I believe it's a he in this case)
is asked to consider the claims of the two partnerships against which the
Farm Service Agency took offsets based on the debt of a third
partnership. He gathers facts, even though the Agency had the
opportunity to gather facts beforehand; the Division's hearing officer
is not bound by those facts, but can require the agency to deliver its
records for the purpose of permitting the Division's examination into
the matter. The two appealing partnerships can expect the Division's
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hearing officer to control the introduction of evidence using some, but
not all, of the tools traditionally used by judges: the adjudicator directs
the flow of the inquiry, charting out who will speak and in what order,
directing pre-hearing conferences aimed at making the hearing time
more productive, issuing subpoenas to compel the appearance of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence, and presiding
over the taking of testimony, ruling on evidentiary objections and
deciding what evidence is appropriate given the issues before him. The
hearing officer brings to this setting a substantial background in the
subject matter: he knows the programs administered by the Farm
Service Agency, knows the difference between payments due under the
Production Flexibility Contract and those due under the Conservation
Reserve Program, and knows that his job is to control the proceeding
so that both the partnerships and the Agency leave feeling confident
that their respective positions have been fairly heard and will be
impartially reported on.
As it turns out, the controlling authority which the hearing
officer cited required that the appellants, in this case the two viable
partnerships, meet a burden of proving, by at least a preponderance of
evidence, that the decision of the Farm Service Agency was erroneous.
That standard came straight from that section of the United States Code
and the Code of Federal Regulations which created the current version
of the National Appeals Division. Also from the CFRs, although not
from the Division's section of the CFRs, came the standard that the
hearing officer used to answer the central question: can an offset be
used against one party in order to collect the debt of another entity?
The conclusion reached by the hearing officer, based on this law, was
no, because the regulation described procedures for offsetting that did
not include using an offset to collect the debt of another entity. The
analysis also extended to whether there had been proper notice of the
intention to offset: from the record before him, the evidence
established that the agency sent notice only to the defunct partnership,
and not to the partnerships operated by the two viable partnerships.
The hearing officer found that there was no record of the two viable
partnerships getting notice, and no record of any previous appeal
determination on the issue of the offset, and as such he found the two
viable partnerships could indeed appeal the Agency's offset of
payments due.
With this brief example to guide us, consider the role of the
hearing officer as he completed the official acts required under the
statutes that created the National Appeals Division. First, what is the
source of the hearing officer's authority in the National Appeals
Division, and how does that authority differ from the authority of
judges of the judicial branch?
If I were to make this presentation to the first year students in
my class on legal reasoning at Capital University, I'd begin by trying
to assure them I was not about to recite a history of the development of
the administrative state or the intent of the Framers of our country's
constitution when Article III was drafted. Instead, I'd explain that the
difference comes down to two of their most pressing concerns, and two
things they are most intimately familiar with: the significant difference
between Article III judges and administrative adjudicators can be
reduced to two key words: time and money. Once they heard those
words, they'd relax, because they know all about the notions of time
and money. My guess is that each of you do, as well.
To understand how the role of the executive adjudicator differs
from that of an article III type of judge, it helps to narrow our focus a
bit. First, recall that the reference to an article III type of judge is one
that arises because article III of the United States Constitution provides
for the appointment of federal judges. The preeminent characteristic
of this provision is that it attempts to assure the creation of an
independent judiciary. How does it do so? It offers time, and money.
This is the well-spring, from which the promise of eternal employment
flows. Article III, section one of the Constitution provides that "the
judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."'2 The next sentence specifies that the judges
of both "the supreme and inferior" courts shall enjoy life tenure and that
their salaries may not be diminished during their continuance in office.3
This brings us to our first distinction: at the federal level, the article III
judge enjoys the safeguards of life tenure and undiminished salary.
The two salient article III characteristics of lifetime tenure and
undiminished salary, are significant. The public perception of justice
2U.S. Constitution Article III, § 1.
'U.S. Constitution Article III, §1.
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requires both accountability from our courts and judicial independence.
Justice Blackmun, writing in Freytag v. Comm. of Internal Revenue,
makes the point that the concern over judicial independence was an
integral part of our constitutional architecture.' In a case that reviews
the structure of the United States Tax Court and centers on whether the
Chief Judge of that court may make appointments for special trialjudges, Justice Blackmun recalls the notion of how the separation of
governmental powers is expected to preserve judicial independence.'
He observed how the Appointments Clause in Article II of the
Constitution limits congressional discretion to vest power to appoint
"inferior Officers" to three sources: "the President alone," "the Heads
of Departments," and "the Courts of Law."6
In Freytag, Petitioners argued that a special trial judge (in this
case a tax hearing examiner) is an "inferior Officer," and also contend
that the Chief Judge of the Tax Court does not fall within any of the
Constitution's three repositories of the appointment power.7 The Court
was not persuaded, and Justice Blackmun explained that "The roots of
the separation-of-powers concept embedded in the Appointments
Clause are structural and political.' Our separation-of-powers
jurisprudence generally focuses on the danger of one branch's
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch.' There is thus
a constitutional limitation imposed on the selection of article III judges:
the limitations restrict Congress and the President from attempting to
upset the balance of authority between the three branches of
government. Were the political branches of our federal government to
try to staff article III courts to further a political ideology, they would
be confronted by an existing cadre of more than 700 article-III judges
who enjoy life tenure. They would also have to mobilize a combination
of political continuity, executive determination, the absence of strong
resistance in the Senate, and a large number of vacancies. In contrast,
one commentator has written, "'stacking' a commission with a small
number of members who enjoy limited terms is considerably easier,
4501 U.S. 868 (1991).51d. at 878.
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especially at its creation, when all seats are vacant."
I mention this characteristic of the creation of article III
judgeships because of the difference between creating such a judgship
and creating the position of an administrative law judge or an
administrative hearing officer. Our Constitution intentionally
concentrates independent judicial power with the article III judge, as a
means to deliberately limit the number of adjudicators having that
power. This keeps one executive administration, or one or two sessions
of Congress, from packing the judicial system with independent
adjudicators who obtain their positions during that particular
administration. You have only to reflect on our recent past Congresses
and Presidents to imagine how different our judicial system would be
if either branch was able to create large numbers of independent
judgeships whenever they found sufficient votes in Congress to
accomplish this mission. But that doesn't happen with article III
judgeships. It can, however, happen with the executive adjudicator, and
for proof I need look no further than the men and women assembled
here today.
The political reality of our position as members of the
administrative judiciary is that we attain our positions not through the
process of constitutional appointment, but instead by virtue of a
delegation of both legislative and executive authority. We do not
generally enjoy the gift of unlimited time in office, but instead are in
many cases wholly dependent upon the good will of the executive
office we serve. We almost certainly do not enjoy protection against
the diminishment of our salaries. You can't just fire a federal judge:
only by an impeachment conviction can one be removed from office.
That's simply not the case with those of us who chose careers as
executive adjudicators.
It is not by happenstance or chance that administrative
adjudicators reach the bench by means other than constitutional
appointment. In the evolution of our collective court, we have gotten
to where we are today because those who preceded us served a need
that was different than the need met by article III judges. As
administrative adjudicators, we don't do the same thing as judges of the
judicial branch of government, although we use many of the same tools.
Consider the genesis of what is generally recognized as the first of our
modem administrative agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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The ICC was established by Congress under the powers of Article I,
and has as its enabling authority the power to administer statutory
schemes of federal regulation. Characteristic of the administrative state,
its authority was over disputes involving public rights -- things like
public transit licenses, railroad rights of way and the like; and an article
III court (here I'm referring specifically to the federal district court)
reviewed the ICC's decisions on a de novo basis, so that even after the
agency made its own fact finding decisions, the federal district court
could and would review all of those facts all over again. In its formative
years, the notion was because there was this level of review and
scrutiny by an article III court, that the administrative bench need not
be independent at all, given that the scope of its authority was limited
to resolving public rights disputes arising from the implementation of
legislation, and given that an article III court would review any decision
made by the executive adjudicator. The whole point of the traditional
"public rights" analysis has often been that no judicial involvement at
all was required -- executive determination alone would suffice. This
meant that the executive adjudicator did not have to be very "judge-
like," and could be very much an integral part of the executive branch,
not at all independent of the branch being served.
In considering our heritage as administrative adjudicators, we
should note that by the 1930s the administrative court was entrenched
and expanding, sharing much of the same apparent authority as that
possessed by article III courts, but still without the constitutional
protection of life tenure and undiminished salary. In the 1932 case
cited as the fountainhead of this trend, the Supreme Court upheld
Congress' decision to vest responsibility for deciding cases under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in an
administrative agency. The Court in Crowell v. Benson assumed that
public rights disputes may not require judicial decision at either the
original or appellate level.'° Even in private rights cases, Crowell held,
an administrative tribunal may make findings of fact and render an
initial decision of legal and constitutional questions, as long as there is
a adequate review in a constitutional court." In order for these
administrative adjudicators to be permitted in a private rights case, the
'0285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
"Id. at 50.
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Court required that the "essential attributes" of the judicial decision
must remain in an article III enforcement court, with the administrative
agency or other non-article III adjudicator functioning less as an
independent decision-maker than as an adjunct to the court. 2
Thus, at the threshold of the New Deal, we see the Court's
ratification of the administrative judiciary, even over the private rights
of citizens, particularly in the case of regulatory agencies which restrict
private activity, and typically possess the power to lay down rules, to
determine whether private parties have violated the law, and to
prescribe sanctions. When we add to this the welfare or entitlement
agencies created to dispense public funds through entitlement
programs, we have what has become familiar to us as the administrative
state. The benefits from the evolution of the Fourth Branch are tangible
and significant.
In my article on the difference between an executive adjudicator
and an article III judge, I note that one commentator suggests there are
four important values that support permitting the use of non-article III
tribunals in place of constitutional courts. 3 Each of these may make it
easier to understand why we as administrative adjudicators are not
expected to behave, in all ways, like judges of the article III judiciary.
First, as administrative hearing officers, we are expected to have
an interest in making the best use of expertise to implement a
substantive regulatory agenda. Unlike article III judges, who can
perform only adjudicative functions, agencies and legislative courts can
apply their expertise not only to adjudication but also to rule-making,
administration, and reporting to the legislature, the President or
Governor, and other decision makers. Mixing adjudicative with
administrative and rulemaking helps to adapt adjudication to the
implementation of regulatory powers in a way that might not be
possible within a scheme of strict separation of powers.
Second, as administrative hearing officers, we have an interest
in attaining reasonable efficiency and order in the performance of basic
governmental functions. We were created by Congress and by our state
general assemblies to provide a prompt and accessible alternative to the
1 Id. At 51.
1318 J.N.A.A.L.J. I (Spring 1998).
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judicial process. Consider the range of governmental functions that one
might argue should be brought to article III courts, functions like those
performed by the taxing, welfare, employment services authorities. And
then consider the nightmare that bringing these cases would create if the
administrative court were removed.
A third interest is one that hits at the heart of many of us, and
can be the source of serious concern. The establishment of non-article
III tribunals leads, by design, to a greater flexibility by the tribunal to
changing needs and political priorities. Congress can experiment with
the creation of ALJ positions, or with the creation of positions
possessing some but not all of the attributes of the ALJ position (like
the administrative hearing officer) all as a means for accommodating a
particular legislative agenda. As it does so, Congress can also call for
adjudicative reviews by persons lacking life tenure, and then as the
need arises can terminate the experiment without ever having created
unremovable and underutilized article III judge positions. The obvious
implication here, one ratified by court decisions from the Supreme
Court on down, is that the administrative judiciary does not have the
structural independence given to the article III judiciary - to the
contrary, Congress has created the administrative judiciary, controls the
scope of its mandate, can terminate the positions of its administrative
adjudicators, and needs no constitutional mandate to do so.
On a more positive note, the fourth reason for the vitality of the
administrative judiciary is the belief in the proposition that nonjudicial
proceedings can produce fairer and more consistent results than those
realized through ad hoc judicial determinations. At the federal level,
for example, commentators have noted that judicial determinations --
those from article III-type courts, about whether a person should be
considered disabled for Social Security purposes tend to be less
consistent and equitable than judgments based on bureaucratic rules
that reflect statistical regularities and likelihoods.
These characteristics and benefits inure to both the state and the
federal administrative bench. Over time, they have been the impetus
for an entrenched and interwoven legal culture that looks to us and to
article III courts for assurance that the benefits of adjudication by non-
article III courts outweigh the costs associated with the loss of an
independent adjudicator. And thus we come to the first of three areas
where this assembled body can and should take note of its collective
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role in society. The appointment of an administrative adjudicator is
accomplished by a wide variety of vehicles, where some are selected
through organized applications like those used by the Office of
Personnel Management in the selection of Social Security ALJs; at the
other end of the spectrum, there are those holding the title of ALJ or
hearing examiner who are screened by the agency they serve, hired by
the agency, evaluated by the agency, subject to discipline by the
agency, and rewarded by the agency. This latter approach carries with
it the very real aura of dependence, not independence. As we have
heard in the past, the public looks at this captive ALJ and asks "how
can I expect to win this case when the [agency] is my accuser,
prosecutor, and judge?" One commentator wrote that this statement
exemplifies the public perception of administrative law judges being
biased and partial to their employing agencies.
The answer for the parties appearing before the National
Appeals Division is that there is now a structural separation between
the agencies and Division hearing officers. The separation is not
complete, however: Congress has elected not to separate the Division
from the Department entirely; rather, it retained in the Department the
administrative adjudicator, choosing only to separate the adjudicator
from the individual agencies. This choice by Congress forces us to
recognize that the hearing officers of the National Appeals Division are,
by design, not independent of the Department. And it's equally
important to recognize that the absence of independence is one of the
essential elements that sets us apart from our judicial colleagues both
at the federal district court level and in state courts throughout the
country. While we must strive to be impartial in our adjudications, to
suggest that a hearing officer of the National Appeals Division is
independent of the Department is simply not supported by the law as it
has been written. Congress intended the Division to provide its services
through the auspices of the Department. Contrast this to the successful
implementation in a majority of our states, where a corps of hearing
examiners or administrative law judges is created as an entity unto itself
- the central panel of hearing examiners recommended by the Model
Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, adopted by the House of
Delegates for the American Bar Association in 1997. Under the central
hearing agency plan, a cadre of hearing examiners or administrative law
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judges is created as a stand-alone department of state government.
Panel adjudicators then preside over agency hearings and render
decisions through a process that retains in the executive branch ultimate
control over the hearing officer, but which more fully insulates the
hearing officer from agency pressure or influence.
There's no comparable vehicle in federal administrative law,
although it has been the object of certain groups of administrative
lawyers and judges since the early 1980s. Without it, the hearing officer
is, by Congressional design, not independent of the agency he or she
serves. There can be little question that under the present structure, the
hearing officer is not free to interpret the law; the authority to do so
rests squarely with the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture.
This may be difficult to reconcile with our judicial instincts: there's
probably not a person here today who hasn't bristled at the thought of
someone else telling us how to interpret a law; and each of us has
probably had some experience with a superior officer who we were
convinced didn't understand the law well enough to apply it correctly.
Just the same, the limitations that Congress set when it created the
Division compel the conclusion that the hearing officer of the National
Appeals Division is not authorized to exercise independent judicial
authority. No one among us could rationally argue that we have the
power to hold someone in contempt of court; yet there's not an article
III court judge who lacks that power. And this is not a condition that
applies just in the Department of Agriculture. Consider the experiences
of ALJs serving the Social Security Administration. When Congress
created the hearing examiner position (which is the precursor to the
modem Administrative Law Judge), there were proposals which would
have placed them outside of the Administration and into a separate
entity. Instead, Congress created a special class of examiners whose
salary, promotion, and tenure rights were protected not by the Social
Security Administration but instead by the civil service commission.
Here's how the General Counsel of the Health and Human Services
Department described the level of independence attributed to Social
Security ALJs: "Administrative law judges are not policy independent.
There can be no serious dispute that the Commissioner, and not the
15,000 or so agency adjudicators, has the responsibility for interpreting
the law in order to carry out the programs that Congress has assigned
to the Social Security Administration. In matters of law and policy the
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ALJs are subordinate to the Commissioner's responsibility to interpret
and apply the statutes and set rules in case of adjudication. While ALJs
are delegated the authority to make decisions in individual cases on
behalf of the Commissioner, it is the Commissioner who has the
responsibility to ensure that ALJ decisions comport with the law and
the Agency's rules and policies. If this were not the case, agency rules
could be subject to conflicting and varied interpretations and the
coherence of the administrative program would be seriously impaired.
Different individuals could have different rules applied to their cases
without knowing it, based on which ALJ had adjudicated their case, or
whether their case was decided at the [Department] or ALJ level. ALJs
apply the adjudicatory rules as set by the Commissioner to the facts of
the cases before them as the administrative law judges find those facts.
Unlike Article III judges, ALJs do not have discretion to decide what
the appropriate interpretation of the law is."' 4
Part of the purpose in making these observations is that we do
well to distinguish between partiality and dependence as we describe
our adjudicative roles. If one can, at least for the moment, accept the
proposition that a hearing officer need not have judicial independence,
then the next question might aptly be, okay, so what is required? And
the proper answer to that is, it depends- it depends on the law creating
the decision-making body, and it depends on baselines that are
recognized as part of our federal constitutional guarantees of due
process under the Fifth Amendment. We'll get to the due process
requirements in a moment, but first let's consider the requirements
imposed under the statutes that created the National Appeals Division.
"5 What's the source of the authority for hearing officers at the NAD?
Public Law 103-354, enacted October 13, 1994, and codified at 7 USCS
6992 delegated to the Secretary of the USDA the authority and the duty
to create the National Appeals Division. By this Public Law the new
NAD also picked up the functions of the prior NAD, the National
Appeals Division established by section 426(c) of the Agricultural Act
of 1949 (7 U.S.C. 1433e(c)). It also assumed the functions that had
been performed by the National Appeals Division that had been
S4Arthur Fried and Ronald G. Bernoski, Panel Discussion on Independence and the
Federal Judiciary, 18 J.N.A.A.L.J. 47, 49 (Spring 1998).
137 U.S.C. §6992(a)(1998).
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established by subsections (d) through (g) of section 333B of the
Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act (7 U.S.C. 1983B), and
appeals of decisions made by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,
and appeals of decisions made by the Soil Conservation Service.
What's the nature of the delegated authority? The NAD
provides a forum for hearing evidence, offering this forum to those
who have received an adverse decision from one of the designated
agencies of the Department. The adjudicative function is circumscribed
by a statute that represents the delegation of authority, from the
Congress and the President (through the legislative process) to the
Secretary, and from the Secretary to Director, who serves for a 6-year
term of office, is eligible for reappointment, and who"shall not be
subject to removal during the term of office, except for cause
established in accordance with law.'1 6 How does the delegation of this
statutory authority have an impact on the day to day work of a hearing
officer in the NAD? If the power to operate a forum for hearing
evidence is circumscribed by delegated authority - unlike a
constitutional grant of authority to "administer justice" - then we need
to look at the statute (and the regulations promulgated under the statute)
to set out the limits of what can take place in the forum. This is not a
forum that operates independent of the agency; it's a true executive
adjudication forum, and if it is to operate according to law it has to do
so within the scope of the statutes that created the forum. The role of
the hearing officer is to direct the activity of the forum, within the
structure provided by the legislation that created the forum. 7 USCS §
6997 provides the statutory structure for all Division hearings. The
statute sets out the general powers of Director and hearing officers. It
does so first by making sure the NAD (both its Director and the
assigned hearing officer) has access to the case record developed at the
agency level.' 7  The statute also prescribes the administrative
procedures the Director and the hearing officers are expected to abide
by. Included in these statutorily articulated powers are the authority to
require the attendance of witnesses, and the production of evidence, by
subpoena and to administer oaths and affirmations." And included in
6Id. §6992(b)(1) - (b)(2).
77 U.S.C. §6997(a)(1).
1Id. §6997(a)(2).
the statutorily articulated duties is the prohibition against ex parte
communication. 9
Also in the legislation were some statutory standards for getting
the work done efficiently, including limits on the time for hearing,
where the appellant generally is entitled to a hearing by NAD within 45
days after the date of the receipt of the request for the hearing; rules
about where the hearing should be held (generally in the appellant's
home state); and some statutory standards for the rules to be followed
during the hearing, which the NAD hearing officer is expected to
enforce: The evidentiary hearing before a hearing officer shall be in
person, unless the appellant agrees to a hearing by telephone or by a
review of the case record.20 The hearing officer shall not be bound by
previous findings of fact by the agency in making a determination.2'
And some explicit statutory language directing what should be
considered by the NAD hearing officer during the hearing, rules that
appear to anticipate agency responses to the claims raised in these
appeals: "Information at hearing. The hearing officer shall consider
information presented at the hearing without regard to whether the
evidence was known to the agency officer, employee, or committee
making the adverse decision at the time the adverse decision was
made.22 The hearing officer shall leave the record open after the hearing
for a reasonable period of time to allow the submission of information
by the appellant or the agency after the hearing to the extent necessary
to respond to new facts, information, arguments, or evidence presented
or raised by the agency or appellant."23 And some specific guidance on
the standards to be applied by the hearing officer with respect to the
burdens borne by the litigants ("The appellant shall bear the burden of
proving that the adverse decision of the agency was erroneous.")2 4 And
finally, an express deadline for issuing a decision, a provision for what
happens if no appeal is taken from the hearing officer's decision, and
instructions as to the effective date ("The hearing officer shall issue a
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hearing or after receipt of the request of the appellant to waive a
hearing, except that the Director may establish an earlier or later
deadline.)2 15 "If the determination is not appealed to the Director for
review under section 278 [7 USCS § 6998], the notice provided by the
hearing officer shall be considered to be a notice of an administratively
final determination 26'" "The final determination shall be effective as of
the date of filing of an application, the date of the transaction or event
in question, or the date of the original adverse decision, whichever is
applicable.""
So the Act created a fairly comprehensive structure for
providing an executive adjudicator for persons adversely affected by
decisions made by several agricultural agencies of the federal
government. But the hearing officer is by no means an outsider: he or
she is part of the Department, bound to apply the law given
interpretations handed down by the Department, even when to do so
might seem to lead to unfair or inequitable results. Where's the judicial
equivalent of a safety net, the protection against overreaching by the
executive or legislative branch? What's to stop Congress from enacting
laws that create only the facade of a fair hearing?
Although there is no requirement that the executive adjudicator
be independent of the agency he or she serves, there certainly is a
requirement that the adjudicator be impartial and unbiased. While
article III judges draw their separate rank from the Constitution, the
executive adjudicator and those who appear before the adjudicator can
look to the due process clause for protection against overreaching by
the government. This is by definition an inferior mandate to that of the
article III judge. It is the product of a balancing of costs and benefits,
and is measured by the realities present in the forum. The NAD
adjudicator serves an executive function not shared by the article IIIjudge: and certainly his or her authority is no greater than that of the
Division itself. While the executive adjudicator cannot be called
independent of the executive branch, the decisions of the adjudicator -
like the decisions of an article III judge, must be impartial. As the




of your job is to be fair and impartial. Fairness and impartiality mean,
among other things, avoiding bias based on race, sex, ethnicity,
religious beliefs, age, or socio-economic status. Similarly, you should
avoid bias in favor of the agency or private parties. It also means
preventing your personal or political beliefs from influencing the
outcome of a case. 28
And ultimately, your ability to faithfully carry out your chosen
profession here hangs on your ability to impartially consider the claims
of all who appear before you. True, this means having to accept the
interpretations of law handed down by the Office of General Counsel,
because that office speaks for the Secretary on interpretations of law.
To do otherwise would leave your appellants wholly unable to rely on
a consistent body of law, and would deprive them of the a fair hearing
before a fair tribunal.
I should add at this point that the notion calling into question the
role ofjudicial independence for the administrative adjudicator is by no
means a simple or one-dimensional issue. Social Security
Administrative Law Judge Ronald G. Bemoski offers a thoughtful
counterpoint to the comments of the General Counsel in the same issue
of the Journal, where he reminds the reader of the rich history of the
administrative law and the administrative law judge, and invokes the
quote from the often-cited case of Butz v. Economou, 29 to the effect that
an administrative law judge functions in a manner comparable to that
of a trial court judge. Judge Bemoski invokes the role of the Due
Process Clause, and expresses a frustration common among our
colleagues when he says "we understand completely that within the
framework of administrative law, it is both the duty and the
responsibility of the agency to promulgate rules under the
Administrative Procedure Act. We also understand that administrative
law judges are bound to follow these rules. But we have difficulty with
agency rules that are not consistent with the law."3
28United States Department of Agriculture, Hearing Officer Manual of the National
Appeals Division, 3.
29438 U.S. 478 (1978)
3
"Arthur Fried and Ronald G. Bemoski, Panel Discussion on Independence and the
Federal Judiciary 18 J.NAALJ 47, 53 (Spring 1998).
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This tension between the quest forjudicial independence for the
executive adjudicator and the need for consistent executive
adjudications will likely continue to manifest itself: consider the
instance where a court of appeals in one jurisdiction interprets a
provision of law one way, yet the Department reaches a different
conclusion. While the decision is binding in the appellate jurisdiction
where the issue has been decided, it may be challenged by the
Department in other jurisdictions, under the doctrine of
nonacquiescence. The Supreme Court recognizes the value of this
doctrine, as it explained in the case of US. v. Mendoza.31 Justice
Rehnquist observed in that case that allowing the federal agency the
option to continue to test the merits of its interpretation of the law
against that of the jurisdiction that ruled contrary to the agency makes
sense, because to do otherwise would "deprive this Court [i.e., the
Supreme Court] of the benefit receives from permitting several courts
of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants
certiorari."32 But the outside observer might reasonably conclude that
the agency has no business disregarding the decision of the first court
of appeals, and indeed should acquiesce in that first judgment. This
conclusion can be the source of tension between the administrative
adjudicator and the agency, particularly if the doctrine of non-
acquiescence is not explained to the adjudicators.
Before concluding my remarks, I would like to make a brief
effort at predicting the future for the National Appeals Division.
Speaking as an advocate for administrative adjudications, one who
believes traditional courts need the alternatives that arise in the agency
hearing, I see the Division as being partly but not fully evolved. Gone
are the days when the only fact-finder a claimant could turn to is
someone hired by and controlled by the agency. With the 1994
legislation that expanded the role of the Division, Congress has moved
the agricultural community a step farther along to road towards creating
a system that not only is fair to the appellants but in all ways appears
fair. No doubt more than a few appellants have left a proceeding
3'464 U.S. 154 (1984)
32Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 Vale L.J. 679 (1989) (quoting U.S. v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160
(1984).
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feeling the disappointment that comes from not prevailing against a
governmental agency, and with that disappointment there was probably
the sense that the government's adjudicator was an employee of the
Department being charged with errors in judgment. Ideally, as each
new state moves towards the creation of a stand-alone central panel of
hearing examiners, members of Congress will likely take notice of
these trends, and see how the streamlining of executive adjudications
that have saved money for the states might likewise be a good move for
the federal administrative judiciary. So you might well watch for the
further evolution of the federal executive judiciary.
But for now, the 1994 legislation recreating the NAD suggests
that our lawmakers found it useful to provide a forum somewhat
removed from the adversarial worlds that spring up between the
executive branch and the people we all serve. The Director ultimately
shoulders the burden of being the focal point between these two sides,
but once the hearing officer completes the task of gathering evidence,
and applying the law to the facts presented, much of the tedious work
that would otherwise have been borne by our district courts is
accomplished, with greater efficiency and with an informed hearing
officer. To the extent this continues to offer an efficient way to fairly
hear facts and make preliminary decisions based on recorded facts, our
legislators will likely expand the administrative judiciary, using hearing
officers instead of administrative law judges and district judges,
retaining in the Director a vital role in melding both the adjudicative
and executive functions like those present in the NAD. Due process will
continue to be an elastic concept, one driven by practical realities as
well as a keen eye towards that which not only is fair, but appears to all
participating to be fair. The NAD hearing officer will succeed when
those who appear in the NAD forum leave convinced they have been
heard by an informed and impartial hearing officer who was
knowledgeable in the controlling law and capable of applying facts
presented to that law.
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